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## **Research Symposium 10**

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# **Abstracts 2018**



# The *Dhūma* episode of the *Avadānaśataka*: the case of an actorless miracle in Buddhism

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## Abstract

When trying to precisely define the sanskrit word *prātihārya*, commonly rendered by “miracle”, one has to consider two types of episodes: canonical descriptions of the three *prātihāryas* (*rddhi-*, *ādeśanā-*, and *anuśāsanīprātihārya*), and narratives corresponding to these descriptions. Such an inquiry reveals that miraculous events occur in a very specific context where the role of protagonists is as essential as the performance itself. Thus, along with the display of superhuman powers (*rddhi*), mind-reading (*ādeśanā*), or instruction (*anuśāsana*), that are the specific contents of the miracle, comes the intention of the performer and the mind disposition of the spectator: they both should tend towards conversion to Buddhism. The performer must attract the spectator to Buddhism, but also has to make sure of the positive reception of his display by the audience.

In light of this definition of *prātihārya*, the *Dhūma* episode of the *Avadānaśataka* turns out to be problematic: the miracle has no direct performer. In Śrāvastī, devotees of the *tīrthika* Pūraṇa and of the Buddha confront each other by a “request of truth” (*satyopayācana*), but only the Buddhist obtains a miracle: offerings fly towards the Buddha, then staying in the Jetavana. The amazed crowd follows these objects to the grove, and there sits down to hear the Buddha teach. It is the words of the Buddhist that cause the miraculous phenomenon to happen: he is the *indirect* performer. Does this episode thus invalidate the previous definition of *prātihārya*? Starting from the keyword *satya*, I aim to unravel the possible link between the power of truth and Buddhist miracles. I will especially focus on episodes containing “statements of truth” (*satyavākya*) such as the *Prātihāryasūtra* of the *Divyāvadāna*.

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Broad subject area:- *Bhāṭṭa-Mīmāṃsā Epistemology*.

Title:- *A Critical Analysis of Mīmāṃsā-sūtra 1.1.4, with reference to 'Vṛttikāra', Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathimiśra*.

The paper I propose to present will critically analyze the meaning of *Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-sūtra* (MS) 1.1.4:

*Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṅām buddhijanma tat  
pratyakṣamanimittam vidyamānopalambhanatvāt* (M.S. 1.1.4)

The analysis of the *sūtra* will be carried out keeping in mind the interpretation of the *sūtra* as given by commentator '*Vṛttikāra*'<sup>1</sup> (before 1<sup>st</sup> century BC). '*Vṛttikāra*' has interpreted the *sūtra* as being composed of two parts, whereby the first part,

*Satsamprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṅām buddhijanma tat  
pratyakṣam*

is understood by him as giving forth a definition of *pratyakṣa*. He further transposes the two words '*sat*' and '*tat*' of the above-mentioned 'first part', in order to make it more appropriate for being read as a definition of *pratyakṣa*. In my paper, I will discuss this position in the first section entitled: '*The Vṛttikāra's interpretation of MS 1.1.4*'. In response to this *pūrva-pakṣa* is the critique of *Kumārila-bhaṭṭa* (7<sup>th</sup> century AD) found in the *Ślokavārttika*. *Kumārila* advances a series of arguments, against the position of the *Vṛttikāra*, for not reading the *sūtra* as being composed of two parts and further, not taking the 'first part' of the *sūtra* as a definition of *pratyakṣa*. In conjunction with *Kumārila's* arguments, I will deliberate upon the views of *Pārthasārathimiśra* (9<sup>th</sup> to 11<sup>th</sup> century AD), who has written a commentary on the *Ślokavārttika*, known as *Nyāyaratnākara*. I analyze the arguments against *Vṛttikāra* in the second section of my paper entitled: '*MS 1.1.4 does not give forth a definition of pratyakṣa: Kumārila-bhaṭṭa and Pārthasārathimiśra*'. Having analyzed the positions of the *pūrva-pakṣa* and the *siddhāntin*, I draw my conclusion in favour of *Kumārila-bhaṭṭa*, that MS 1.1.4 of *Jaimini* is not to be taken as giving forth a definition of *pratyakṣa*, the reasons for which I will explicate in my paper.

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1 The '*Vṛttikāra*' is one of the many commentators of *Jaimini's Mīmāṃsā-sūtra*, who is considered to have lived before the popular commentator *Śabarāswāmi* (1<sup>st</sup> century AD). However the former's commentary now seems to have been lost and we get to know about him and his views only from the references made to him in other's works. For instance, in the fourth chapter of the *Ślokavārttika* and *Nyāyaratnākara* where *Kumārila-bhaṭṭa* and *Pārthasārathimiśra* examine his position as being the *pūrva-pakṣa*.

What are the fundamental defilements of the mind: The systematisation of the list of mental defilements (*kleśa/kilesa*) in Pāli Buddhist texts

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My research topic is to examine how the theory of mental defilements undergoes changes through both the Theravādin and the Sarvāstivādin Abhidharma texts, and the extant Abhidharma texts of other Buddhist schools, and further to compare common and distinctive features of each Buddhist school's perspective on mental defilements. This paper, however, aims to examine the systematisation and development of the theory of mental defilements mainly in Pāli Buddhist texts.

I divide their systematisation into three stages: 1) several lists of defilements with various terms in early canonical sutras (Pāli nikāyas and Chinese āgamas); 2) the unified list of ten defilements under the name of *kilesa* in early and later Abhidhamma texts; and 3) the finalized list of unskillful mental factors (*akusala cetasika*) which includes fourteen defilements.

Through looking at this change, it is worthy to note that some individual defilements are strangely included or excluded in the process of systematisation. They are; sleepiness (*middha*), regret (*kukkucca*), shamelessness (*ahirika*), non-fear of wrongdoing (*anottappa*), envy (*issā*), and stinginess (*macchariya*). Sleepiness and regret, for example, which are firmly established as major defilements in the list of five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*) from the early sutras are excluded in the list of *kilesa*, but taken their place back in the list of *akusala cetasika*. Shameless and non-fear of wrongdoing are never included into any defilement groups, but in the list of *kilesa*. Envy and stinginess which are considered as secondary defilements are added in the list of *akusala cetasika*. I will also scrutinize what their exclusion or inclusion implies.

The study of defilements will reveal doctrinal controversies between different schools, and it might give us a helpful indication of determining relative chronological order among Pāli texts.

# Ancient Form, Modern Interpretation: Reading a 21st Century *Vādagrantha*

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While there has been much work on contemporary Indian philosophical writing in English and other modern languages, research largely disregards modern philosophical work written in the Sanskrit language. After its peak in the medieval period, Sanskrit commentarial practice (*bhāṣya*) upon the *Upaniṣads* and other philosophical texts has been generally dormant. A few have written *bhāṣyas* on these texts, but until recently, a *bhāṣyakāra* (traditional commentator) has never himself authored a *vādagrantha*, the corresponding dialectic treatise based upon the *bhāṣyas*. Sadhu Bhadreshdas, of the BAPS Swaminarayan order, recently authored the five-volume *Svāminārāyaṇabhāṣya* on the *Upaniṣads*, *Bhagavad Gītā* and the *Brahmasūtras* (2007), followed by the *Svāminārāyaṇasiddhāntasudhā* (2016), a classically-styled *vādagrantha*.

Bhadreshdas' modern interpretations of ancient traditional texts make us question whether we should categorise recent Sanskrit philosophical texts as 'ancient' or 'modern', as stylistically, they align closer to the former. By analysing Bhadreshdas' *Svāminārāyaṇasiddhāntasudhā*, and the method by which it traces and references concepts and passages in the *Upaniṣads* and the *Vacanāmṛt*, a pre-modern didactic text of the *Svāminārāyaṇa* tradition written in Gujarati, we shall witness the critical and systematic engagement of both ancient and more modern texts and their use of *śāstrīya* (scholarly) Sanskrit form. I will argue that the subtle intertextual references are used to authenticate the *Akṣara-Puruṣottama Darśana*, with the use of Sanskrit adding further authority to the works. From this, I claim that markers such as 'ancient' or 'classical' Indian philosophy represent *style* rather than periodisation, and that Sanskrit scholarly work does not 'die'<sup>1</sup> in the pre-modern period, but continues to be written artistically even today.

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<sup>1</sup> Pollock, Sheldon (2001). "The Death of Sanskrit". *Comparative Studies in Society and History*. Cambridge University Press. 43 (2): 392-446. pp.393

## **Dream in Buddhism: The dispute between the Vijñānavāda and the Madhyamaka schools.**

The Yogācāra-Vijñānavādin and the Mādhyamika thinkers possess the same mahāyānist background. Nevertheless, whereas the Yogācāra school states that every single thing which is perceived is nothing but consciousness, the Madhyamaka school considers that everything is *śūnya*, empty or pure void. The former defends the unreality of perceived objects, but the reality of their conscious apprehension. The latter stands up for the unreality, both of the νόημα and the νόησις, that is of the object and of the consciousness itself.

These philosophical inclinations strongly determine the way in which each school interprets dream and the so-called dreaming argument, which compares the dreaming state with the waking state and regards them as similar.

The dreaming argument has become a cornerstone in Indian philosophical debates. However, this argument likely was born in early Buddhism, thus it has been initially restricted to intra-buddhistic debates, and only later became the priority target for the Brahmanical adversaries of the Buddhists. In the present paper, I would like to demonstrate that the dreaming argument already occurred before its *locus classicus* in Vasubandhu's *Viṃśikā*, a vijñānavādin treatise, although it is difficult to determine whether this argument was rather Vijñānavādin or rather Mādhyamaka in origin. I assume that the analogy between the dream and the waking state was already in use in Indian (maybe not only Buddhist) literature and religious texts (*suttas*, *sūtras* and so on) before entering the philosophical sphere.

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### **Sanskrit satire and its humour: Kṣemendra's *Samaya-mātrkā* within Sanskrit literature**

As part of my dissertation (defended in November 2017), I translated the whole *Samaya-mātrkā* of Kṣemendra into French (appended to the dissertation volume). I am now working towards an edition of the *Samaya-mātrkā* so as to publish an edition cum translation of the text (by 2019).

My paper will try to delineate how the *Samaya-mātrkā* relates to other Sanskrit literary texts and what sets it apart. I will go over Sanskrit satire as a literary genre to put Kṣemendra's work in the broader context of Sanskrit literature. By comparing Kṣemendra's *Samaya-mātrkā* to the author's other satires, by comparing his satires to other Sanskrit literary works and also by comparing briefly Kṣemendra's satirical texts to Theophrastus' *Characters* and Juvenal's *Satires*, one can better characterise the originality of the text. As we look into the *Deśopadeśa*, the *Kalā-vilāsa* and the *Narma-mālā*, we find many parallels with *Samaya-mātrkā*'s characters, scenes and situations.

If by their very subject matter, Kṣemendra's *Samaya-mātrkā* and Dāmodaragupta's *Kuṭṭanī-mata* are indeed related, Kṣemendra is far from simply imitating his renowned predecessor. The *Samaya-mātrkā* stands out indeed as an original literary work.



**'What should I, ill-fated, do?': Madness and Culpability in the *Naiṣadhānanda***

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The *Mahābhārata* has had an enduring appeal over the centuries, in part due to the complexity of its 'heroes'. Capable both of incredible generosity and unbelievable cruelty, the *Mahābhārata* often offers an equivocal representation of its characters: Duryodhana gifts Karṇa a kingdom in the *Ādiparvan* yet humiliates Draupadī in the *Sabhāparvan*; Yudhiṣṭhira is hailed as the 'dharma-knowing' (*dharmajñā*) ruler but succumbs to his gambling addiction. How then, are these conflicting characterisations reconciled?

Attempts to resolve these inconsistencies are found in the dramatic tradition, most notably in Kālidāsa's *Abhijñānaśākuntala*, where the inclusion of the curse and ring exonerates Duṣyanta's rejection. Motifs of madness and supernatural interference are used extensively, often in conjunction, both within and without the dramatic tradition. Such motifs serve as an allegory allowing the authors to navigate issues of transgression and responsibility with subtlety. This is most evident in the *Nalopākhyāna* and its subsequent dramatic reinterpretations, which uses the tangible presence of Kali ('Chaos' Personified) to explore the realities of compulsion and abandonment.

Thus, making a comparative study of the *Nalopākhyāna* and Kṣemīśvara's *Naiṣadhānanda* (10<sup>th</sup> c.), I shall argue that the playwright reshaped the material in accordance with his own aesthetic and ideological vision in two ways: firstly, he emphasised the role of external factors and downplayed Nala's inherent flaws. Secondly, he included additional scenes which allowed Nala's goodness to be considerably enhanced. This sharply contrasts with the epic, which expressed Nala's wrongdoings using the language of madness and 'unseeing', echoing the descriptions of Yudhiṣṭhira, Nala's mirror, in the gambling episode. Kṣemīśvara thus followed a trend of exculpation seen in both Kālidāsa and Bhavabhūti's dramas, whereby misconduct is contextualised, enabling these heroes to become truly 'heroic'.

(298 words)

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## **The Death of a Yogi. The Relation between Yoga and Death in Early Śaivism**

Nowadays, at least in the West, yoga is mainly associated with health-enhancing body practices and ideas concerning mindfulness. However, the (historical) ‘goal’ of yoga was not a mindful life, but *mokṣa* (liberation).

As opposed to the idea of *jīvanmukti* (liberation whilst living), in various early yoga traditions a yogi first had to die in order to achieve liberation (*videhamukti*). Already in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* (e.g. ChU 8.6.4) we find passages that instruct one to progress up from the body (*śarīrād utkrāmati*), thereby securing entrance into the brahmāloka. In tantric texts too we find detailed instructions concerning the ways a yogi can induce his own death, especially through a practice called *utkrānti* (upward progression/’yogic suicide’).

Less attention concerning the relation between yoga and death has gone to traditions of yoga in the early centuries of the Common Era, such as the now extinct Śaivite tradition of Pāśupatas. In the current paper I present passages of the *Pāśupatasūtra* (early 4<sup>th</sup>-5<sup>th</sup> century CE) and the *Skandapurāna* (ca. 6<sup>th</sup>-7<sup>th</sup> century CE) that deal with the last moment of the life of a Pāśupata. From textual sources it becomes clear that 1) the state of yoga equals liberation and 2) that the Pāśupata had to abandon his body in order to achieve this yoga: yoga and death probably stood in a much closer relation than one might expect.

In this context, especially some of the material that will be presented from the *Skandapurāna* is interesting, because particular relevant passages have not been translated and analysed before. I look forward to present parts of my translation and discuss problematic passages.

# **Sītā Strikes Back: A Citrakāvya from the Wodeyar Court**

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## **Paper Abstract**

The *Sītārāvaṇasamvādasharī* is a remarkable feat of constrained poetry (“Citrakāvya”) in Sanskrit by Cāmarājanagara Rāmaśāstrī, a court poet of King Krishnaraja Wadiyar IV of Mysore. The work consists of fifty verses, each a conversation between Sītā and Rāvaṇa. In each verse, Rāvaṇa attempts to persuade Sītā of his own glory and Rāma’s assured defeat. Sītā castigates Rāvaṇa and scorns his offer in the last line of each verse. However, this last line is also punned advice to Rāvaṇa to repeat his words after deleting or substituting a letter. When these changes are effected, the verse transforms to suggest Rāvaṇa’s death, Rāma’s victory, and Sītā’s rescue. This astonishing Citrakāvya form is Rāmaśāstrī’s innovation, with little precedent in the tradition. The work is also remarkable in not suffering from the affectedness of language endemic to Citrakāvya.

The paper attempts to introduce this little known work and discuss it in the context of the Citrakāvya tradition. What are the general principles behind the construction of such verses? Where does this work stand in the tradition of kūṭakāvya? The paper also briefly examines some recent works that imitate Rāmaśāstrī.

## **Bio**

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**Title of the Paper:** Vasubandhu and the doctrine of Perfuming (*vāsanā*) in *Yogācārabhūmi*

**Subject Area:** Buddhist philosophy, Abhidharma, Yogācāra

**Abstract:** On the issue of Robert Kritzer's hypothesis that Vasubandhu was already a *yogācāra* when he composed *Abhidharmakośa*, Changhwan Park argues that the key notion of perfuming (*vāsanā*) used by Yogācāra is entirely not attested in Vasubandhu's seed (*bīja*) theory, which is merely the specific transformation in continuity (*saṃtāti-pāriṇāma-viśeṣa*). However, in his *\*Nyāyānusāra*, the orthodox Vaibhāṣika Saṃghabhadra criticizes Vasubandhu's seed theory with its synonym of perfuming; he even claims that Vasubandhu also used the notion of perfuming. Moreover, Vasubandhu, in the context of proving the existence of *ālaya-vijñāna* in his *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*, explicitly states that the potency of specific transformation is not possible without perfuming. These facts demand us to reevaluate Park's plausible methodology. In this paper, I will examine the doctrine of perfuming in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and relevant *abhidharma* texts to see whether Vasubandhu's theory of seed as specific transformation in continuity was largely influenced by Yogācāra.

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2) The Criticism of Theism in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*

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One of the most frequently asked philosophical questions is about the creator of the world. According to some Indian theists, it is *īśvara* or *brahman* who is the absolute and the creator of the world. This idea had been criticized by the Buddhists since the earliest times dating back to the lifetime of Buddha Śākyamuni. This presentation attempts to shed light on how the Buddhists refute the existence of God as a creator in connection with practice. It focuses on the *Śrāvakabhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the main text of the Yogācāra school of the Mahāyāna Buddhism. The *Śrāvakabhūmi* was probably completed at the earliest stage of compilation of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and describes the practice that can take a practitioner to *nirvāṇa* in accordance with the teaching of the *śrāvakayāna*. It seems quite common to all Buddhist sects that they prove that no creator of all phenomena exists by means of logic in the sequence of arguments with Non-Buddhists. However, little attention has been paid to the fact that according to the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, a yoga practitioner deals with the denial of a creator as a part of his practice, not just as an intellectual exercise. There is only a single study on this topic in the Yogācāra texts, i.e. Osamu Hayashima “The Criticism of Theism in the *Xianyang shengjiao lun* with a special reference to the chapter named *Proof of Impermanence*” (*Research Report of Humanities, Faculty of Education, Nagasaki University* No. 40, pp. 23–39, 1990, language: Japanese), which is focused on a different chapter of the *Yogācārabhūmi* than the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. I hope that my talk will give new insights into this important but overlooked aspect of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.

(299 words)

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## From equanimity to yogic meditation

In the first part of this paper I will present a number of passages from the *Dharmasūtras* and the *Śāntiparvan* of the *Mahābhārata* that prescribe and/or describe the lifestyle of mendicants and share a number of recurring terms and themes. These passages deal mostly if not exclusively with the lifestyle of mendicants and their mental states without any explicit mention of further ascetic or yogic practices to be undertaken. I will argue that these passages, taken at face value, present equanimity (*samatva*) as an independent and sufficient path to peace (*kṣema*) or happiness (*sukha*).

In the second part of this paper I will discuss passages from two texts in which equanimity is presented as a preliminary to yogic meditation. First, I will show that the *Manusmṛti* uses similar terminology to describe the sage following the fourth life-stage (*āśrama*) but incorporates yogic meditation (*dhyānayoga*) in his practice. Second, I will consider Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* 2.42 which deals with one of the preliminary practices of yoga - *samtoṣa*. I will note that the *Bhāṣya* to this *sūtra* quotes a verse which appears twice in *Mahābhārata* in *adhyāyas* which deal with the tradition of equanimity. Observing this link with the tradition of equanimity also helps to explain why this *sūtra* attributes to *samtoṣa* a goal which is somewhat unusual for a preliminary practice, namely, unsurpassed happiness (*sukha*).

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### **From the Canon to the Comment: A Development of the Concept of “*iddhi*” within the Pāli Buddhist Literature**

This study aims to identify developments and continuity starting from the Buddhist canonical tradition to the commentarial one. In my paper, I will analyse the concept of *iddhi*, a term which could be translated as “success”, “accomplishment”, “psychic power”. In spite of the wide range of applications of this term, I will deal with the use of *iddhi* indicating the extraordinary capacities achieved through the practice of meditation. A person who develops these abilities is able to multiply his physical form or to return to a single unit, can become invisible or visible, can pass through physical obstacles, can dive in the earth and walk on the water, can fly through the air, can touch the moon and sun and, lastly, can exercise bodily power as far as the Brahmā World. Within the Pāli Buddhist texts, the oldest account which reports the possibility to achieve these kinds of extraordinary capacities is, most likely, present within the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta* (*Dīgha-nikāya* I, 77-79). Starting from the *Sāmaññaphala-sutta*'s account, I will analyse how this particular application of the term *iddhi* is developed within the Buddhist Pāli literature. At this regard, I will take into account the exposition of the extraordinary capacities reported within the late canonical (as well as semi-abhidhammic) text called *Paṭisambhidāmagga*, the late compendium of Buddhist doctrine called *Visuddhimagga*, and some Pāli commentaries such as the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* (*Dīgha-nikāya-aṭṭhakathā*) and the *Saddhammappakāsinī* (*Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā*).

## The Nyāyasūtra against the Pāśupata concept of God

an old interpretation with a new proof

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Outlines: Early *nyāya* theology

Abstract: The *Nyāyasūtra* introduces an argument for the existence of God (NS 4.1.19-21) which is probably the most ancient in the history of Indian philosophy. This argument was subject to various interpretations. The first interpretation was given by Vātsyāyana in his *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Vātsyāyana – despite the *avataraṇa* – does not read the NS 4.1.19 as *pūrvapakṣa*. This suggests that the *avataraṇa* might be part of an older layer of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. Uddyotakara in his *Nyāyavārttika* follows the interpretation of Vātsyāyana.

S. J. C. Bulcke in his classic book<sup>1</sup> suggests two additional interpretations. In both of these interpretations the NS 4.1.19 is *pūrvapakṣa*. According to his first interpretation the *Nyāyasūtra* is defending the existence of God against those who do not acknowledge God as an actuating cause of the *karma*. In his second interpretation Bulcke suggests that this part of the *Nyāyasūtra* argues with a *Pāśupata* theory according to which God is an independent cause – God is not dependent on the *karma*. Bulcke suggests that this *Pāśupata* idea might have been around by the time of the *Nyāyasūtra*. His account of *the Pāśupatas* is based on a late work, the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha*.

By the time Bulcke wrote his book there was already an edition of the *Pañcārthabhāṣya*, the earliest commentary on the *Pāśupatasūtras*. The *Pañcārthabhāṣya* states that God is not dependent on the *karma*. It seems to me that Bulcke's suggestion was right: the date of the *Pañcārthabhāṣya* is very close to the date of the *Nyāyasūtra*. The latter might refer to an already existing *pāśupata* theory.

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<sup>1</sup> C. BULCKE, S.J. *The Theism of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1947. Pages 31-35



# 10<sup>th</sup> International Indology Graduate Research Symposium

## Paper Proposal

**Name:** Tilak Parekh

**Education:**

- BA Theology and Religion, University of Oxford (2014-2017)
- Postgraduate Diploma in Sanskrit, Gujarati and Hindu Studies, Shree Somnath Sanskrit University, India (2017-current)
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**Title: “aham brahmā’smi” - Ātmabuddhi with the Brahmasvarūpa Guru**

**Abstract:**

The Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad’s famous mantra, “*aham brahmā’smi*” (I am Brahman), has been the subject of much literary, philosophical, and theological discussion, especially within the Advaita tradition. Whilst the Advaitin claims the self to be Brahman, Svāminārāyaṇa theology posits Brahman as an external ontological entity, distinct from the self (*ātman*) and god (Parabrahman). In this context, “*aham brahmā’smi*” is interpreted to reveal *ātmabuddhi* (literally ‘self-perception’) with the *brahmasvarūpa guru*, who is believed to be the human embodiment of the singular entity, Brahman. *Ātmabuddhi* thus provides a novel, non-monistic understanding of this mantra, calling for a more nuanced discussion on spiritual identity. For example, Svāminārāyaṇa texts interpret ‘identity’ between ‘*aham*’ (the self) and ‘*brahma*’ (the *brahmasvarūpa guru*) as a *qualitative* similarity (*guṇasāmya*) rather than a substantive ontological union (*tattvaikyā*). The Svāminārāyaṇa interpretation of this mantra thus helps explain the critical role texts and theology play in centralising and prioritising the *guru* in the lives of Svāminārāyaṇa devotees, in their *sādhana* (orthopraxy) for *mokṣa*, and in the formation of their identities. To demonstrate this, I will analyse selected Sanskrit passages from the Bhagavad-Gītā, Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad, Brahmasūtras and Bhāgavata-Purāṇa, bringing them into dialogue with the Vacanāmṛta, a canonical Gujarati text of the Svāminārāyaṇa tradition. I will also situate the Svāminārāyaṇa position within the wider system of Vedānta by comparing it with various interpretations of “*aham brahmā’smi*” provided by leading exponents of other schools, such as Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Madhva. By studying selected sections from key Hindu and Svāminārāyaṇa texts in their primary language, this paper makes way for a complex conversation on identity formation, religious practice, and textual interpretation.

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- BA Theology and Oriental Studies, University of Oxford
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**Title:** Original Argument, Distinct Philosophy: The interpretation of '[sa] dahara uttarebhyah' in the Vedanta commentaries of Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, and Bhadrēśadāsa

**Subject Area:** Commentarial traditions, Indian philosophy

**Abstract:**

Commentaries on the *Brahmasūtra* are many and varied. The claim to originality by the commentators is puzzling from a superficial glance because of similar argumentation between different commentators. However, upon further inspection, it becomes apparent that the very definition of 'originality' needs to be modified in order to understand the originality of the bhāṣyas. An interesting by-product of 'originality' in commentaries is the coherency of exegeses. While the question of originality has been broached of India's commentarial traditions, the subject of both originality and coherence has not been examined in conjunction. The result of examining the two together helps uncover a commentary's dialectical ingenuity.

This paper studies the first *sūtra* of the *dahara* section in the *Brahmasūtra* commentaries of Rāmānuja, Śrīkaṇṭha, and Bhadrēśadāsa. I shall examine how commentators make their exegesis original and coherent. Commentators achieve 'originality' through their selection of foundational texts and the arrangement of quotations from those chosen texts. 'Coherence' is built by using logical 'common sense' arguments and performing literary analysis. I will examine each commentators' exegesis on the *sūtra* in sequential order as it will best reveal the gradual and intentional use of foundational texts, logical argumentation, and literary analysis. I argue that in employing these techniques, the commentators advocate their distinct philosophy as rooted in the foundational texts, which is their main purpose in writing a commentary, while still managing to produce an original and coherent exegesis. This paper will conclude that the exegesis of the three commentators on the first *sūtra* of the *dahara* section can be considered original and coherent because of their appropriate and adequate use of quotations from a selection of foundational texts, the arrangement of the quotations, literary analysis, and logical argumentation.

## ***Proposal for IIGRS***

*Unnata Pragma, Mphil*

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*PhD candidate*

### ***Semantics of the Polysemous term Samudghāta in Jaina and Buddhist literature***

In Jaina philosophy, *samudghāta* (pkt. *samugghāya*) refers to ‘soul’s partially projecting outside its prevailing residential body under special circumstances.’

My research being a text historical investigation of the term *samudghāta* explores the Jaina exegetical literature and Buddhist texts. The different approaches and interpretations of the term will be traced. The Polysemous nature originates from the root '*han*', which have two meanings - motion and destruction, consequently rendering two meanings to the term *samudghāta* in Jaina exegetical literature. The Jaina theories the soul’s projection outside the body which inclines to the meaning ‘movement’ while the soul destroys the karma and hence it is about ‘destruction’. My research demonstrates that both meanings cohere with each other.

Having created a clear layout of the Jaina textual scholastic approach, then the Buddhist literature where the Pāli variant of the term is ‘*samudghāya*’ will be discussed which uses the term in its generic sense of 'destruction'.

Further to better apprehend the Jaina lexicon treasure, the term *samavahata* (pkt. *samohaṇai*) used synonymously for *samudghāta* will be analysed. Though the term stems from the same root *han*, and carry a variant prefix of *ava*, the meaning remains unchanged. Interestingly the Buddhist literature does not seem to have such a term with same meaning and different prefix, rather they use *samūhatā*.

The investigation leads to a pertinent question related to the phenomenon of a term receiving special technical usage within one tradition and not in the other while they both are presumably in the same time line. Thus, the linguistic analysis shall render insight not only

on the semantics but the intended philosophical background which leads to such a diverse approach. I demonstrate that the term *samudghāta* receives an upgraded meaning of 'projection', for the philosophical need of the Jaina, while such a metaphysical phenomenon is absent in Buddhist.

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Subject Area: Indian Philosophy of Mind

**Distinct Yet Dependent: The Interplay Between the Mind and *Ātman*  
in *Svāminārāyaṇa* Hindu Philosophy**

Abstract

Since Plato, dualistic Western philosophy has viewed the mind as an immaterial phenomenon, influencing the material body. The acknowledgement of the mind as consciousness is conceptualised most definitively by Descartes, whose epistemological enquiry argues for the reality of the mind as the very base of knowledge, succinctly expressed as '*cogito, ergo sum.*' By contrast, the *Vedānta darśana* of Indian philosophy views both the mind and the body as composed of *māyā*, and thus material and insentient (*jaḍa*). Conversely, the ontologically higher, eternal *ātman* is immaterial and sentient (*cetana*). This paper seeks to examine and explain these important metaphysical differences, drawing specifically from the *Svāminārāyaṇa* school of Hindu philosophy.

*Svāminārāyaṇa* (1781-1830) clearly outlines the attributes of the mind in the *Vacanāmṛt*, a nineteenth-century pedagogical text authored in Gujarati. Although being one, it functions in four ways as the inner faculties (*antaḥkaraṇa*) – the *manas* (thinking), *buddhi* (reasoning), *citta* (contemplation), and *ahaṁkāra* (affirming identity). These are collectively referred to as the mind, and form four of the nineteen elements of the subtle (*sukṣma*) body. Thus, the mind is described as being material, yet also subtle. Although the *ātman* is distinct from the mind and physical (*sthūla*) body, which are both *māyic*, it has erroneously identified itself with them. In order to rise above *māyā* and attain *mokṣa*, this apperception must be overcome. Yet, no matter how sentient the *ātman* is, it cannot perceive nor comprehend without the use of the *antaḥkaraṇa*. By examining this fascinating interdependency, I argue that *Svāminārāyaṇa* reifies the relationship between the mind and the *ātman* in an incisive way, offering a contemporary and practical perspective on the utilisation of this interplay as a means to attaining *mokṣa*. This paper thus adds new insights into the conceptualisation, function, and purpose of the mind from a Hindu philosophical standpoint.

# THE PRE-ŚAIVA MAHĀKĀLA OF UJJAYINĪ

PÉTER SZÁLER

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Ujjayinī, one of the most important Hindu pilgrimage sites is widely known as Śiva's city. The great deity of the famous Mahākāla temple has been worshipped as its main patron until the present day. However, Phyllis Granoff has recently demonstrated that some early sources such as the *Harivaṃśa* (112.125–126) as well as the *Bṛhatkathāślokaśaṃgraha* (1.4.) regard Mahākāla as Śiva's *gaṇa* and therefore she concluded that Mahākāla was originally a local god whom the Śaivas step by step adopted at first as Śiva's *gaṇa* than as the hypostasis of the great deity himself.<sup>1</sup>

In my paper, I would like to develop further Granoff's hypothesis and try to reconstruct, as far as possible, the figure of the pre-Śaiva Mahākāla. I shall analyze the myths of the region, such as the Jaina tale of Kālaka, the Bāṇa- as well as the Kārtavīrya-legends, and search for common motives which may help to define the main characteristics of the local cult before Śaivism became dominant.

## Outline of content:

Introduction – Granoff's theory, methodology

The legend of Kālakācārya – a Jaina tale about the sage Kālaka, the king Gardabhilla and the Śakas' arrival in Ujjayinī; main motives: smuggling, the evil king of Ujjayinī

Bāṇa as Mahākāla – *Harivaṃśa* 106–112; aspects corresponding to the Jaina tale, Śaiva and Saura impacts

Kārtavīrya of Māhiṣmatī – a Bāṇa-like solar figure in the neighbourhood who likewise attained divine rank

Conclusion – parallels between Bāṇa and Kārtavīrya; Sun-cult: the story about the restraint of the Sun

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<sup>1</sup> GRANOFF, Phyllis: Mahākāla's Journey: From Gaṇa To God. In: *Rivista degli studi orientali*. 2003. Vol. 77. Fasc. 1/4. 95–114.

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Subject area: Buddhist philosophy

**Cognitive obstacles in the way of liberation in Vasubandhu's *Triṃśikā* and Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya***

As is the case with most philosophical traditions in India, theoretical speculations in the Yogācāra school of Buddhism are closely connected with practical and soteriological objectives. Accordingly, the Yogācāra texts can be read not only as philosophical considerations, but also as guides to how to attain liberation, what the main obstacles to achieving it are, and what precisely *arhatship* and buddhahood consist in.

In my presentation I would like to analyse the cognitive changes that constitute the arduous process of reaching the states of *arhatship* and buddhahood as it is presented in the relevant passages of Vasubandhu's late treatise, the *Triṃśikā*. Due to the brevity of the verses, I will also consult its detailed commentary written by Sthiramati, called *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, which also offers some original interpretations of Vasubandhu's ideas. I will try to make it clear how Vasubandhu and Sthiramati reinterpret the traditional contrast between *arhatship* and Buddhahood in specific Yogācāra terms, emphasizing cognitive rather than moral differences. I will also attempt to explicate how the abandoning of cognitive and afflictive obstructions leads to the "overturning of the basis" and to the emergence of the supramundane knowledge of the buddhas. Indian philosophical schools generally held that liberation or insight into the ultimate reality can be achieved either by means of some kind of intuitive, mystical experience or by rational, discursive knowledge. Examining the way leading to buddhahood will also shed some light on how Vasubandhu combines these two approaches to ultimate reality.

Abstract of the Paper for IIGRS, 2018

**Uddyotakara's Criticism of Sāṃkhya on Causality:  
With a Reflection on Early Nyāya Theism**

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In classical Indian philosophy, there exist two mostly opposed ways of understanding the notions of causal relations, namely, *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda* that are advocated by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya respectively. In this paper, I will argue that while views from both sides can adequately explain the phenomenon of change from a microcosmic perspective, from a macrocosmic perspective, i.e. the generation of universe, the *satkāryavāda* presented by *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (SK) and *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* (GBh) is faced with serious theoretical drawbacks that are astutely pointed out in Uddyotakara's criticism in his *Nyāyavārttika* (NV). Moreover, as this criticism belongs to a bigger picture of Uddyotakara's argument that God (*Īśvara*) is indispensable in the causal sequences, I intend to reveal that Uddyotakara's arguments on refuting *satkāryavāda* and on proposing the existence of God are actually two sides of the same coin. My ultimate objective is to show that despite the flaws in Uddyotakara's arguments, his convincing criticism of Sāṃkhya and his innovative approach to reconcile the law of karma with *Īśvara* should receive more attention.

This paper will have three parts: I will provide in section one an analysis of *asatkāryavāda* and *satkāryavāda* in relation to the ontology of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Sāṃkhya by examining of the relevant paragraphs in SK, GBh and NV. Then I will elaborate on the detailed arguments of Uddyotakara's criticism of Samkhya in NV, which constitutes the section two of the paper. In section three, I will further explore the notion of god in NV and its implications as regards the law of karma, and will provide a way to understand Uddyotakara's seemingly paradoxical project in NV.